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Abstract This study investigates whether corporate real estate ownership
is a trigger for takeovers. The empirical analysis is based on a
sample covering 225 takeovers in France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom between 1992 and 2003.
Using a multivariate probit model that controls for various
ﬁnancial ﬁrm characteristics, the ﬁndings show that the role of
corporate real estate in takeovers depends on the nature of the
takeover, the industry, the period, and the country. The presence
of corporate real estate is a signiﬁcantly positive predictor for
takeovers within the same industry. Companies that have been
taken over appear to have been reducing their real estate holdings
prior to the takeover, which would suggest a ﬁnancial distress
situation.
Real estate does not generally receive a lot of attention from corporate executives.
For many of them, real estate is an asset they don’t know much about, and aren’t
very interested in. Managing real estate assets is usually quite different from
managing the core competences of the ﬁrm. It is viewed as just one of the
production factors needed to make and sell the products in which the true
competence of the ﬁrm lies.
Indeed, in an oft-quoted survey of more than seven hundred executives of large
ﬁrms in the United States, Arthur Andersen and Company (1993) reported that
the vast majority of respondents did not feel a need to link strategic real estate
planning with business planning. Very few companies produced recurring reports
on the performance and value of their real estate assets, suggesting that real estate
was not managed efﬁciently in the early 1990s. This notion has been supported
by Brennan (1990), who has introduced the term ‘‘latent assets’’ to describe
situations where the stock price of a company does not reﬂect the true value of
all the assets it owns. He speciﬁcally mentioned real estate holdings as a class of
corporate assets for which this label applies. If that would indeed be the case, the
ownership of a real estate portfolio could be an indicator for takeovers.
Brueggeman, Fisher, and Porter (1990) have reviewed real estate’s role in the
corporate restructuring of the 1980s, and they have shown that rational investors294  Brounen, van Dijk, and Eichholtz
may value companies with large real estate holdings at prices well below break-
up value, even when stock markets are efﬁcient. Although their evidence is mainly
anecdotal, they do make a strong case for a dominant role of real estate in
takeovers. They state that ‘‘... the value of corporate real estate is ‘‘hidden’’ from
investors and therefore not fully reﬂected in stock prices.’’
These ideas are informally conﬁrmed in the ﬁnancial press, where articles
regarding takeovers regularly mention the possibility of generating quick revenues
of the target’s real estate portfolio as a motivation for the bidder. As an example,
the German Schickedanz family acquired a majority stake in the German retail
group Karstadt-Quelle in Spring 2005.1 Financial media speculated that the family
could proﬁt from a sale of parts of the group: ‘‘Retail analysts believe the
individual assets of the group are worth far more than the share price currently
indicates.’’ The Financial Times reported estimates of Karstadt-Quelle’s corporate
real estate value ranging from  C6 b .t o C 7b., while the company’s market
capitalization at the time was only  C 1.86b. A more traditional takeover example
in which real estate assets appear to play a dominant role is 2005 merger of Kmart
and Sears, Roebuck and Company.2 The combined ﬁrm holds a real estate portfolio
of 3,400 stores. ‘‘Kmart’s hidden real estate value’’was mentioned as an important
motive for the merger.
Whether or not corporate real estate holdings play an important role in the
corporate takeover market beyond this anecdotal evidence is the main question
this study tries to answer. A search of the existing literature revealed only an
analysis of the U.S. takeover market of the early 1980s. The analysis in the current
study extends the literature by examining the issue for a sample of four countries:
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and by analyzing the
unexamined sample period of 1992–2003. Furthermore, the role of real estate in
these takeovers is analyzed on the basis of a measure of the value of corporate
real estate that is considerably more accurate than measures used in the existing
literature.
This paper proceeds as follows. First there is a brief overview of the literature
regarding corporate property actions, followed by a presentation of more
information concerning the data and data sources. Next, a predictive takeover
model is developed, which enables isolation of the impact of corporate real estate
ownership on takeover likelihood. The paper closes with a summarization of the
main results and conclusions.
 Corporate Real Estate and Management Decisions
If real estate has a large stake on the corporate balance sheet and proﬁt and loss
account, then it seems unlikely that it would not ﬁgure in the bidder’s deliberations
regarding a possible takeover. Veale (1989) estimated the costs associated with
owning corporate properties, and reported that these costs have become second
only to payroll costs in many organizations. Relative asset values have ﬁrst beenCorporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers  295
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estimated by Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983), who concluded that real estate
accounts for 25% to 40% of the total assets of the average U.S. ﬁrm. More
recently, Seiler, Chantrath, and Webb (2001), using a sample comprising eighty
U.S. companies, reported a slightly decreasing trend in real estate ownership from
values around 32% of total assets in 1985 to approximately 27% in 1994.
Brounen and Eichholtz (2004) extended the U.S. analysis to nine of the most
important economies worldwide. They looked at corporate real estate ownership
in time, across countries, and across 18 industrial sectors. For their complete
sample, corporate real estate holdings were shrinking as a percentage of total
assets, from 34% of total asset value in 1990 to 28% in 2000. However, they
found that this percentage differed greatly across countries and sectors, with strong
corporate real estate ownership in Australia and Canada, and relatively low values
in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Real estate ownership tended to be high
in industries that need very user-speciﬁc real estate, or for which real estate is a
key value driver, such as food retail. This would suggest that country and sector
are of signiﬁcance in real estate’s role in takeovers. Based on these studies, we
can conclude that real estate’s corporate position is still important, but
decreasingly so. Assuming corporate space needs have not structurally changed,
this implies that companies increasingly choose to rent their space.
The performance effects associated with real estate holdings have been
investigated by Deng and Gyourko (2000) and Seiler, Chantrath, and Webb (2001)
for the U.S., by Liow (2004) and Liow and Ooi (2004) for a sample of Singapore
companies, and by Brounen and Eichholtz (2004) for an international sample of
companies. These studies showed that high property ownership levels were
associated with poor stock performance for risky ﬁrms (Deng and Gyourko, 2000),
with weak abnormal return performance (Brounen and Eichholtz, 2004; and Liow,
2004), and with weak economic value added (Liow and Ooi, 2004). Besides that,
real estate ownership is shown not to generate diversiﬁcation beneﬁts (Seiler,
Chantrath, and Webb, 2001).
The research regarding corporate property-related actions mainly involves real
estate spin-offs and sale-and-leaseback transactions.3 Hite, Owers, and Rogers
(1987) showed a 5.7% average share price increase on spin-off announcements,
using a sample that covered the period from 1962 to 1982. They split their sample
into spin-offs by non-real estate companies and those by real estate companies,
and found that the stock market reaction was signiﬁcantly larger (9.1%) for the
former than for the latter—no statistically signiﬁcant reaction was found for that
group. Glascock, Davidson, and Sirmans (1989, 1991), Myer, He, and Webb
(1992), and Booth, Glascock, and Sarkar (1996) have done research in a similar
vein, and also found a positive abnormal return associated with corporate real
estate divestiture announcements, which suggests that stockholders beneﬁt when
companies sell their properties, providing some support for the latent asset idea
of Brennan (1990).
Sale-and-leaseback transactions have received more research attention. Rutherford
(1990, 1992), Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1990), Alvayay, Rutherford, and296  Brounen, van Dijk, and Eichholtz
Smith (1995), and Ezzell and Vora (2001) have all documented positive price
reactions to the announcement of sale-leasebacks of real estate by U.S. ﬁrms.
They attributed these wealth gains to the reallocation of tax beneﬁts. That is why
Alvayay, Rutherford, and Smith predicted that the value of taxes transferred from
the U.S. government through these transactions would be reduced by the U.S. Tax
Reform Act of 1986. Their empirical evidence showed that this is indeed the case.
Besides these tax effects, existing ﬁnancial theory would suggest that sale and
leasebacks should have effects similar to other types of debt. More recently, Fisher
(2004) has also analyzed sale-and-leaseback transactions, distinguishing long-term
and short-term leasebacks. In the former, the real estate continues to be integrated
in the ﬁrm to a greater extent than in the latter. Fisher developed a theoretical
model of the sale-and-leaseback transaction, predicting that ﬁrms choose shorter
lease lengths when there are positive wealth gains to be captured relative to
continued ownership of the asset. Her empirical results indeed showed that only
sale and leasebacks with short leases were associated with a positive abnormal
return for the shareholders of the selling ﬁrms, while those with long-term leases
were not.
Rutherford and Nourse (1988) investigated the impact of the formation of
corporate real estate units by companies using a standard event-study approach.
Here also, gains to shareholders were reported, and, interestingly, these gains were
highest when the real estate subsidiaries thus created were publicly listed.
In short, the empirical evidence to date suggests that corporate real estate sales
create positive wealth effects, and that these wealth effects depend on two things:
the corporate tax regime, and the degree to which the real estate remains integrated
within the selling ﬁrm. Stronger wealth effects are associated with higher potential
tax shields and with less integration. The results by Hite, Owers, and Rogers
(1987), Rutherford and Nourse (1988), and Fisher (2004) indicate that market
investors place higher values on real estate assets when in the hands of real estate
companies or specialized property management entities rather than in those of
diversiﬁed companies, which could be a corporate restructuring argument besides
other such arguments mentioned in the literature.
Analyzing corporate real estate sales in the context of ﬁrm takeovers requires a
general understanding of what drives corporate takeovers. A paper by Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) discusses some of these takeover motives, for
example, merger synergies, excess capacity in certain industries, and external
shocks (such as deregulation, oil price shocks, and technical innovations). Besides
these reasons to merge, a number of authors (e.g., Wruck, 1990; and Clark and
Ofek, 1994) have shown that ﬁnancial distress can be an important driver for
corporate restructuring. Firms performing relatively poorly over an extended
period of time are signiﬁcantly more likely to end up as a target in the takeover
market. Other ﬁrm-speciﬁc takeover triggers are the target’s tangible assets
(Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). Using a sample of U.S. ﬁrms, Ambrose and
Megginson (1992) found that the probability of receiving a takeover bid is
positively related to tangible assets. In his 1990 study, Ambrose repeated thisCorporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers  297
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analysis by focusing primarily on the role of corporate real estate holdings instead
of the broader deﬁned ‘tangible assets.’ Investigating a sample of 170 successful
and unsuccessful U.S. takeovers in the period 1979 through 1986 using a
general logit probability model, he discovered that corporate real estate holdings
signiﬁcantly increased the likelihood of a ﬁrm becoming a takeover candidate.
Overall, the takeover literature shows that ﬁnancial variables capturing ﬁnancial
synergies and distress are most successful in determining why some ﬁrms turn
into targets while others do not. In line with Ambrose (1990), this study extends
this framework by adding corporate real estate holdings to the equation. If
corporate real estate is managed in a suboptimal manner, high corporate real estate
holding might inspire raiders to bid on the ﬁrm in order to retrieve the concealed
corporate real estate value.
 Methodology
The principal objective of this study is to assess whether holding more real estate
assets will lead to a higher probability of becoming the target in a takeover in a
sample of international ﬁrms. To that end, it will be determined if a variable that
indicates whether or not a ﬁrm is taken over in a certain year is related to a
number of explanatory variables, including a measure for real estate holdings.
Although a straightforward approach to this question would be a linear probability
model, a signiﬁcant drawback of this methodology is that ﬁtted probabilities can
be less than zero or greater than one. This limitation can be overcome by using
more sophisticated binary response models, as is commonly done in the takeover
literature. Therefore the main analysis is based on a probit model of the following
form:
Xi
1 2 s /2 P(BID,i)  F(X)   ed s . (1) i 2 
Where BID is a binary variable that indicates whether a ﬁrm i receives a takeover
bid and P(BID,i) is the probability that ﬁrm i will be taken over, which is modeled
as a function of the vector of explanatory variables X(i).  is a vector of unknown
parameter estimates that represents the nature of this relationship. Hence, in this
model the probability of a ﬁrm receiving a takeover bid is based on its own
characteristics, which are represented by the vector X(i). In a probit model, the
functional form of this relationship is represented by the cumulative probability
function of the standard normal distribution.4
The model is calibrated in order to include the most pivotal ﬁnancial ﬁrm
characteristics, which are selected based on the literature regarding the prediction
of takeovers (see Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1999; and Espahbodi and Espahbodi,298  Brounen, van Dijk, and Eichholtz
2003). These variables are Return on Assets, Sales over Assets, Growth in Sales,
Average Liquidity Ratio, Cash Holdings over Assets, Debt-to-Equity Ratio, Book
Value of Assets, Price-Earnings Ratio, Dividend Yield Ratio, Price-to-Book Ratio,
and Average Excess Stock Return. Typically, items like Return on Assets, Sales
over Assets, Growth in Sales, Dividend Yield, and Average Excess Return all
function as indicators for ﬁrm performance, hence are expected to have a negative
inﬂuence of the likelihood of a ﬁrm ending up as a target in the takeover market.
The existing literature already showed that weakly performing ﬁrms are more
likely targets than strong performers. Variables like the Average Liquidity Ratio,
Cash Holdings over Assets, and Debt-to-Equity Ratio relate to the ﬁnancial ﬁrm
structure and typically increase the odds of becoming a target, while the Price-
Earnings Ratio and the Price-to-Book Ratio signal the relative value of ﬁrms and
tend to have a negative impact on the takeover probability. This speciﬁcation is
extended by including Real Estate over Assets as an additional explanatory
variable. Moreover, due to the fact that ﬁnancial distress is often found to be a
predictor of takeovers, Change in Real Estate Holdings is included in the model
as well, since companies may be forced to sell (part of) their corporate real estate
holdings to avoid such distress. The exact deﬁnitions of all these variables are
provided in the Appendix. In order to take account of time-variation in the
relationship between real estate ownership and takeover probability, year dummies
are included in all multivariate regressions.5
The literature concerning the prediction of takeover targets using logit and probit
models has taken a fundamental methodological turn with the seminal paper of
Palepu (1986). More recently, Barnes (1999) and Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003)
have made some important contributions to this line of research. Before Palepu
(1986), a number of empirical studies had obtained apparently impressive results
to predict acquisition targets, with reported prediction accuracies up to 90%.
Palepu noted that such accuracy would go against market efﬁciency: if predicting
takeovers was really that easy, investors would use the models, and reap the stock
price appreciation associated with takeover bids. In other words, if these models
would be really that good, why were their makers not rich? Indeed, Jensen and
Ruback (1983) empirically showed that the market has a hard time to predicting
future targets. Palepu then analyzed the empirical methods used in the existing
models, and concluded that their interpretation was fundamentally ﬂawed,
especially in the sampling procedure they employed.
Palepu (1986) described two distinct ways of composing a sample of ﬁrms
consisting of both targets and non-targets in order to obtain a model for predicting
takeovers. In the ﬁrst method, commonly referred to as ‘‘random sampling,’’ n
ﬁrms are drawn from the entire population of ﬁrms. These n ﬁrms are subsequently
divided into targets and non-targets. However, as the ratio of non-targets to targets
in a random sample is likely to be very high, the information content of a random
sample may be quite small. This provides a sound econometric justiﬁcation for
‘‘state-based sampling,’’ in which n1 ﬁrms are randomly drawn from the total
population of target ﬁrms and n2 ﬁrms are drawn from the non-targetCorporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers  299
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subpopulation. The beneﬁt of state-based sampling is that it provides greater
‘‘information content’’ for the model estimation when the number of observations
within a population is small. As state-based sampling can be shown to provide
more efﬁcient estimates, this sampling methodology is employed in this study. An
important caveat of state-based sampling is that the prediction probabilities can
exhibit important biases when the estimation procedure is based on the assumption
of random sampling. Although Palepu suggests a straightforward procedure for
correcting these biases, the primary interest here concerns the ranking of takeover
probabilities, and hence the bias in the estimates of absolute probabilities does
not affect our inferences. The parameters that determine the population probability
p can easily be recovered since ‘‘all the parameters other than the constant term
are unaffected....’’ (Palepu, 1986, p. 21). However, to allow for a proper
comparison between the authors’ state-based sample results with ﬁndings in
previous research based on random sampling procedures, the estimated intercept
of the model is rescaled in accordance with the sample structure (see Palepu,
1986).
The results of the probit regressions are summarized in the exhibits as follows.
First, the point estimates of the coefﬁcients () are depicted. Second, the standard
deviation gives an indication of the precision of the estimate. Third, the statistical
signiﬁcance of a coefﬁcient of a particular explanatory variable can be derived
from the p-value, depicted in the column ‘‘Coefﬁcient signiﬁcant at.’’ All exhibits
also depict n, the number of ﬁrms included in the sample employed for the probit
estimation, and the McFadden R2. The latter statistic is a measure for the
explanatory power of the model, where a higher McFadden R2 indicates that the
explanatory variables are able to explain a larger part of the variation in the
dependent variable P(BID,i). Since the sampling procedure proposed by Palepu
(1986) is employed to build a predictive model of takeovers, these R2sa r e
expected to be low.
 Data
The Thomson One Banker database is used as universe to build the sample of
listed companies. Samples of companies for France, Germany, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom are selected from the database for the period 1992–2003.
The overall sample is selected in the following way. First, all takeovers in which
a change of control has taken place are identiﬁed. Change of control is here
assumed when a change of ownership occurs in the majority of the shares. The
sample only contains third party acquisitions, while management buy-outs and
leveraged buy-outs are excluded. The result was a total sample size of 2,086
takeover targets, of which 1,114 were publicly listed. Since the complete required
set of company information was only available for those 1,114 companies, they
are used as a basis for further analysis.
Finding an appropriate measure for corporate real estate ownership is challenging.
Most previous studies6 use the ratio of property plant and equipment to total assets,300  Brounen, van Dijk, and Eichholtz
but for some sectors—especially the capital-intensive ones—this variable often
contains so much equipment that the perspective on property ownership is blurred.
Furthermore, the extent to which this is the case is very industry-speciﬁc, which
makes this variable hard to use across sectors. Since this study is concerned with
companies across different sectors, a more accurate measure of the true value of
real estate is used. This measure was computed by dividing Worldscope’s gross
book value of real estate (excluding real estate leases) by the book value of total
assets. This variable could be calculated for 225 of the remaining 1,114
companies, so the remaining sample consists of 225 takeover targets.
The ideal situation would be to have current real estate market prices for all 1,114
public takeover targets; however, because this is not possible, the results may be
distorted, so this potential outcome is examined next. First, not having market
prices but book values implies imprecise measurement of property values, and
will therefore make it harder to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship, but this
only means that a statistically signiﬁcant result implies that real estate is indeed
important as a predictor of takeovers. Second, the study is limited to the companies
reporting property values and it is possible that these are the most transparent
companies, making it relatively easy for the stock market to ‘‘see through’’ these
companies and assess the true value of the real estate. This would make mispricing
less likely, and would therefore weaken the possible impact real estate ownership
has on takeover likelihood, again making it harder to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between these variables.
Exhibit 1 pictures the sample distribution for each of the four sample countries,
both in time and across the 15 industries examined. France and Germany are the
dominant countries in the sample. For these countries, there are 96 and 91 takeover
targets in the sample, respectively. The U.K. and Dutch samples are much smaller.
For the U.K. sample, this is mainly caused by a lack of codes linking the different
data sources used. The second panel of Exhibit 1 presents the sample composition
by industry, showing that the sample is not very evenly distributed across sectors.
Miscellaneous Manufacturing is the dominant sector, representing 39% of all
sampled takeovers, while no other sector exceeds 10%: Retail Trade is in second
place with 11% of the sample.
Besides this sample of takeover targets, a control sample was built as follows. For
the same 1992–2003 period, all public companies in the Thomson universe have
been selected for the four sample countries. To avoid survivorship bias, both the
active and non-active ﬁrms are selected. Out of that universe, 2,866 companies
are selected for which accurate corporate real estate data are available for at least
one year during the sample period. As there are no objective guidelines as to how
many control ﬁrms to select, three non-target ﬁrms are randomly drawn for each
target ﬁrm in the sample, as follows. For each year, how many targets are
incorporated in the sample for a given country is determined. Three ﬁrms are then
randomly selected from that country that have not been taken over during the
sample period and for which information about real estate ownership is available
in the previous year (as the probability of a takeover to the amount of real estate
assets in the year before the takeover is analyzed).Corporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers  301
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Exhibit 1  Takeover Sample Distribution by Country, Year, and Industrial Sector
FRA GER U.K. NL Total %
Year
1992 1 0 0 0 1 0%
1993 9 5 2 0 16 7%
1994 7 6 2 0 15 7%
1995 12 5 4 3 24 11%
1996 16 9 2 1 28 12%
1997 8 10 1 2 21 9%
1998 6 6 4 2 18 8%
1999 1 15 1 0 17 8%
2000 11 10 4 2 27 12%
2001 7 6 0 2 15 7%
2002 12 8 3 2 25 11%
2003 6 11 1 0 18 8%
Total 96 91 24 14 225 100%
Sector
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Mining 1 1 0 0 2 1%
Construction 4 4 0 1 9 4%
Food & Tobacco 6 3 0 0 9 4%
Textile 8 3 4 2 17 8%
Chemicals & Petroleum 6 3 2 1 12 5%
Misc. Manufacturing 36 41 5 6 88 39%
Transportation 1 6 0 0 7 3%
Public Utilities 6 10 2 1 19 8%
Wholesale Trade 5 5 2 1 13 6%
Retail Trade 7 12 4 1 24 11%
Hotels 2 0 2 0 4 2%
Personal Services 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Business Services 13 3 2 1 19 8%
Health Services 1 0 1 0 2 1%
Total 96 91 24 14 225 100%
Notes: This table presents the composition of the takeover sample, measured in number of
observations and percentage of the total sample, by country, year, and industrial sector.
Exhibit 2 provides information regarding the intensity of corporate real estate
ownership for the total sample. The sample is disaggregated by sector and covers
the period from 1992 through 2003. In line with Brounen and Eichholtz (2004),
strong cross-sector variance in ownership levels is found, ranging from 52% for
hotels to 9% for public utilities. Looking at corporate real estate holdings across
industries, as reported in the bottom row of the ﬁrst panel of Exhibit 2, the same
decreasing trend reported by previous authors is seen, but in a less pronounced
































Exhibit 2  Corporate Real Estate Ownership Ratios for Total Sample
Aggregated Samples N
Corporate Real Estate Ownership Level
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
Agriculture 25 20% 19% 15% 17% 18% 18% 18% 19% 18%
Mining 62 14% 14% 15% 17% 20% 18% 21% 21% 24%
Construction 78 14% 12% 11% 12% 11% 11% 12% 12% 12%
Food & Tobacco 136 23% 23% 22% 23% 23% 23% 22% 22% 22%
Textile 255 16% 15% 15% 16% 15% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Chemicals & Petroleum 217 15% 14% 14% 15% 16% 15% 15% 16% 18%
Misc. Manufacturing 916 13% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 15% 15% 15%
Transportation 126 18% 18% 17% 17% 20% 19% 20% 18% 20%
Public Utilities 137 9% 10% 10% 11% 12% 11% 11% 12% 14%
Wholesale Trade 178 13% 13% 12% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 15%
Retail Trade 276 22% 21% 21% 22% 23% 23% 22% 22% 22%
Hotels 43 52% 52% 48% 53% 51% 51% 52% 48% 52%
Personal Services 9 10% 11% 11% 11% 11% 12% 12% 13% 14%
Business Services 345 15% 14% 13% 16% 17% 16% 16% 16% 19%
Health Services 63 23% 23% 25% 26% 25% 23% 24% 26% 29%
Total/Average 2866 19% 19% 18% 19% 20% 20% 20% 20% 21%
Notes: This table provides average corporate real estate ownership ratios—measured by the book value of real estate divided by the book value of total
assets—by year and industrial sector for the total four-country sample.Corporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers  303
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Return on assets 2.57 11.24 4.00 22.39 0.51
Sales over assets 1.18 0.71 1.18 0.82 0.29
Growth in sales 17.95 73.40 23.02 49.80 0.33
Average liquidity ratio 0.51 0.25 0.53 0.22 0.11
Cash holding over assets 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.18
Average debt-to-equity ratio 141.32 964.59 45.58 464.34 0.44
Book value of assets 2941.02 14680.35 2908.53 9296.78 0.33
Price earnings ratio 17.03 161.31 13.12 43.23 0.48
Dividend yield ratio 2.34 6.53 2.62 5.09 0.15
Price-to-book ratio 2.64 6.43 2.82 5.15 0.83
Average excess stock return 5.56 53.31 6.74 46.34 0.21
Real estate over assets 0.20 0.32 0.23 0.20 0.17
Real estate over assets
(sector-adjusted)
0.03 0.23 0.00 0.17 0.43
Notes: This table provides mean values and standard deviations for the explanatory variables used
in the probit model. The last column provides signiﬁcance levels of the difference in means
between the target sample and the control group, based on univariate t-tests using pooled
variance estimates.
decreasing overall trend does not imply a decreasing trend for all sectors. Besides
that, it is clear that looking at pure real estate values instead of the Property Plant
and Equipment variable is likely to add some accuracy to the analysis, as the
difference between the two is rather large: previous studies using PPE reported
average corporate real estate ownership ratios around 30%, while this is closer to
20% in the current sample.7
Besides the real estate ownership ratio, a range of ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables
are included in the probit model.8 The data have been manually checked for
outliers, deﬁned as zero values for variables such as Total Assets and
extraordinarily large observations for any of the variables (more than four standard
deviations away from the mean). A very small number of ﬁrms for which these
observations occurred have been removed from the sample. Exhibit 3 presents
statistics for the ﬁrm characteristics that are subsequently used as control variables
in the model for the full sample. The ﬁrst two columns provide information on
target ﬁrms, the next two columns on the non-target control group, and the last
column gives the results of a signiﬁcance test of the difference between the means.304  Brounen, van Dijk, and Eichholtz
Exhibit 4  Multivariate Probit Analysis 1992–2003
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.753 0.826
Return on assets 0.419 0.649
Sales over assets 0.108 0.090
Growth in sales 0.033 0.039
Average liquidity ratio 0.357 0.081
Cash holding over assets 0.648 1.348
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.050*** 0.019
Book value of assets 0.001 0.001
Price earnings ratio 0.001 0.001
Dividend yield ratio 0.045** 0.059**
Price-to-book ratio 0.005 0.002
Average excess stock return 0.114 0.002
Real estate over assets (sector-adjusted) 0.202 0.321
Change in real estate 0.223**
McFadden R2 0.033 0.054
Notes: In Model 1, N  678; in Model 2, N  474.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The numbers are largely in line with Ambrose (1990).9 Like Ambrose, lower sales
growth rates, lower liquidity numbers, and higher leverage levels are found for
the targets compared to the non-targets, but in line with Ambrose’s results, most
of these differences lack statistical signiﬁcance.
 Results
In line with Palepu (1986), an explanatory model of corporate takeovers is
estimated, based on the range of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. Exhibit 4 presents the
multivariate regression results for the entire four-country sample and for the 1992–
2003 sample period. As some sectors exhibit higher real estate ownership levels
than others, in order to capture potential latent asset characteristics of corporate
real estate, real estate ownership should be measured relative to the sector mean.10
The regression results for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables presented in Exhibit 4 exhibit
a number of notable differences with those reported in the existing takeover
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ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress: the likelihood of being a takeover candidate is
associated with weak and shrinking sales, a low liquidity position, high debt, and
low dividend. The latter two effects are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. The other variables are not found to be statistically signiﬁcant. The
coefﬁcients for the ﬁnancial control variables are in line with previous ﬁndings in
the takeover literature and support the ﬁndings of Ambrose (1990). This does not
apply to the ﬁndings regarding the corporate real estate holdings. For the sample
as a whole, a statistically insigniﬁcant relationship is found between real estate
holdings and the probability of being taken over, which contrasts with the positive
and signiﬁcant relationship that was documented by Ambrose (1990) for the U.S.
The fact that distress-related variables are found to be associated with increasing
takeover likelihood is in line with the literature. Clark and Ofek (1994) argue that
a takeover may be a way to reorganize the operations of a ﬁrm in ﬁnancial
difﬁculties, and examine a sample of 38 ﬁrms in distress that have been taken
over in the period 1981–1988. The acquisitions announcements of these takeovers
often indicate that the bidder is acquiring the target because it is perceived to be
in ﬁnancial trouble. Clark and Ofek ﬁnd little evidence that the bidder is able to
reorganize the target successfully, as post-merger performance is generally poor.
A widely cited paper by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) shows that takeovers arise
as a reaction to economic shocks at the industry level, such as deregulation,
changes in input costs, and innovations. Such shocks are also associated with
ﬁnancial distress, forcing the companies in an industry to reorganize. Takeovers
may be a relatively efﬁcient way of achieving this, making these a likely indication
of the underlying economic changes taking place in an industry. The authors are
not aware of any studies documenting the importance of ﬁnancial distress in the
takeover boom in the 1990s.
If distress constitutes a good explanation for the empirical results, the negative
relationship between corporate property ownership and takeovers could be
explained by the sale of properties prior to the takeover. Wruck (1990) describes
that asset sales are often an important part of the organizational restructuring that
accompanies ﬁnancial distress. If ﬁrms have a high debt ratio and a low dividend
yield, selling part of the corporate real estate portfolio in order to relax ﬁnancial
restraints might be an attractive strategic option. This does not necessarily mean
that real estate is a deterrent against takeovers, but that ﬁrms may try to postpone
or avert a takeover by sales in the real estate portfolio in order to increase liquidity
and thereby create escape options. In this case, a decline in real estate holdings
should be observed prior to the takeover, which is exactly what the ﬁndings reveal
(Exhibit 4). Exhibit 4 also reports the regression results when the growth in real
estate is incorporated as an additional explanatory variable. This variable has a
negative coefﬁcient, which is statistically different from zero at the 5% level.
Including this new variable in the model has the additional effect of reinforcing
the negative relationship between real estate ownership and takeover probability.
Consequently, contrary to the existing U.S. literature, the ﬁndings in this study
reveal that corporate real estate ownership may actually deter instead of trigger
takeovers.306  Brounen, van Dijk, and Eichholtz
Exhibit 5  Multivariate Probit Analysis 1992–2003, Across Countries
U.K. Germany France Netherlands
Intercept 0.452 1.487 0.913 0.524
Return on assets 0.432 0.324 0.239 14.575
Sales over assets 0.535 0.027 0.025 0.726
Growth in sales 0.149 0.049 0.247 2.913*
Average liquidity ratio 3.616 1.092 0.115 1.201
Cash holding over assets 4.171 0.163 3.367 1.368
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.083 0.034 0.034 0.127
Book value of assets 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001
Price earnings ratio 0.026 0.001* 0.001 0.069*
Dividend yield ratio 0.008 0.064 0.015 0.101
Price to book ratio 0.054 0.008 0.015 0.305
Average excess stock return 0.010 0.278 0.533 1.089
Adj. real estate over assets 3.229* 0.854* 0.675 0.495
Change in real estate 1.063 0.019 0.862 4.950**
McFadden R2 0.234 0.066 0.096 0.455
Notes: For the U.K., N  50; for Germany, N  219; for France, N  173; for the Netherlands,
N  32.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Based on the earlier quoted empirical work, which found that shareholder wealth
creation through corporate real estate actions was partly driven by the nature of
the tax regime, the results are expected to differ strongly by country, due to the
fact that corporate tax regimes are national. This suggests that the effects of
corporate property ownership on takeovers are partly country-speciﬁc, implying
that insigniﬁcant results for the sample as a whole may be explained with
differences across countries. That is why an analysis on the country level is
conducted as well. The multivariate probit analysis is repeated for each of the
four country sub-samples. The results, as presented in Exhibit 5, differ strongly
across countries, ranging from a positive 3.229 for the U.K. to a negative 0.854
for Germany. In both cases, these regression coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. For the Netherlands, a negative, but statistically insigniﬁcant relationship is
found, while an insigniﬁcantly positive relationship is found for France. Regarding
the Change in Real Estate variable, insigniﬁcant results are found for all countries
except for the Netherlands, where this variable is negative and signiﬁcant. This
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for the targets in the Dutch sub-sample to the Dutch control group, the targets do
very poorly regarding return on assets, sales growth, and free cash ﬂow, and are
much more indebted. Across the board, a pronounced decrease in real estate
holdings is observed in the Dutch ﬁrms that are taken over.
One of the tax issues that could drive the cross-country differences is the level of
property transfer taxes. If these taxes would be very high, then taking over a
company with strong real estate ownership could be a relatively cheap way to
acquire property. If that would indeed be a motivation for a takeover, increased
takeover likelihood with increasing property transfer taxes would be expected.
During most of the sample period, France had by far the highest transfer taxes:
19%, which would be in line with the positive relationship found for that country.
On the other hand, the U.K. has the lowest transfer taxes, and the strongest positive
relationship between takeover likelihood and property ownership. Therefore a
clear conclusion can not be drawn regarding the role of transfer taxes in this
regard.
It could be that transfer taxes do not tell the whole story, and that overall
transaction costs related to the transfer of real estate ownership should be
examined: taxes, agent fees, and legal fees. Taking over a company is a way to
avoid such costs. If this would indeed be a driver for takeovers, the strongest
positive relationship would be found between real estate ownership and takeover
likelihood for the country with the highest transaction costs, and the probability
estimator and the level of the transaction costs would be positively related.
However, this is not the case. In fact, the country with the corporate real estate
coefﬁcient in Exhibit 5—the U.K.—has the lowest transaction costs. Therefore,
transaction costs do not play a role here.
Besides differences in tax regimes and transactions costs, the cross-country
differences could also be explained by market circumstances. The hidden value
of property is unlikely to be present in a situation of falling property prices. This
could imply a negative relationship between corporate property ownership and
takeover likelihood when prices are going down. During the sample period, the
sample country with the worst property market was Germany, which could explain
the negative coefﬁcient for Germany. This notion is supported by the signiﬁcantly
positive coefﬁcient for the U.K., whose property market has generally been very
strong throughout the sample period. This suggests that market circumstances may
indeed play a role in the relationship between real estate ownership and takeover
likelihood.
The relationship between real estate ownership and takeover probability may also
depend on whether the takeover occurs within the same sector. The hypothesis is
that buyers who bid for companies in the same sector are better informed about
the true value of these ﬁrms’ assets than buyers from other sectors. Hence, a more
positive relationship is expected between corporate real estate ownership and
takeover likelihood for within-sector deals than for cross-sector ones. To test this,
the takeover sample is split into two parts, based on the criterion of whether the308  Brounen, van Dijk, and Eichholtz









Return on assets 1.187 1.085
Sales over assets 0.042 0.087
Growth in sales 0.084 0.036
Average liquidity ratio 0.251 0.391
Cash holding over assets 2.815 0.227
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.015 0.035
Book value of assets 0.001* 0.001
Price earnings ratio 0.003** 0.001
Dividend yield ratio 0.044 0.062*
Price to book ratio 0.002 0.004
Average excess stock return 0.337 0.085
Adj. Real estate over assets 1.221* 0.005
Change in real estate 0.006 0.291**
McFadden R2 0.075 0.044
Notes: For Within-Sector Deals Compared to Cross-Sector Deals, N  153; for Within-Sector
Deals Compared to Non Deals, N  404.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
transaction is between companies from the same sector or not. Multivariate probit
regressions are then conducted, one for within-sector deals compared to cross-
sector deals, and one for within-sector deals compared to the control sample of
companies that have not been taken over. Exhibit 6 reports the test results, which
are rather striking: it shows that real estate is a signiﬁcantly stronger deal trigger
for within-sector takeovers when compared to cross-sector ones. When compared
to the non-targets, the probability of a within-sector takeover is also positively
related to real estate ownership, but this relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant.
These results suggest that informed buyers seem to be induced by the presence
of real estate assets to a greater extent than non-informed buyers. Interestingly,
the growth in real estate over assets enters the regression depicted in Exhibit 6
with a negative sign, suggesting that the effect of changes in real estate detected
in Exhibit 4 stems in part from the within-sector deals.Corporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers  309
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 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of corporate real estate ownership in the corporate
takeover market for four countries. To measure corporate real estate values, a
proxy is employed that has not been used before in the literature. The measure is
the book value of property assets, which is a much more accurate reﬂection of
property value than the property plant and equipment variable that has been used
hitherto.
Unlike Ambrose (1990), this study does not ﬁnd a consistent statistically
signiﬁcant and positive relationship between corporate real estate holdings and the
chance of becoming a takeover target for the sample as a whole. Rather, this
relationship is found to depend on country, sample period, property type, the
industry the target is active in, and the nature of the takeover. The association
between real estate holdings and takeover likelihood is very country-speciﬁc, and
ranges from positive to negative according to country. The nature of the country
effects causing these results are examined and suggest that property transfer taxes
are unlikely to drive the reported differences. Property market circumstances, on
the other hand, do seem to have some inﬂuence on the relation between real estate
ownership and takeover likelihood.
Lastly, informed buyers of corporations (i.e., those active in the same sector as
their targets), are found to be more likely to be triggered by the presence of real
estate assets than buyers from other sectors. This suggests that underpricing of
corporate property assets may still be present, but that it may be hard to spot.
To investigate these issues more deeply, it would be advisable to do a clinical
analysis of a smaller sample of takeovers, and study in greater detail the role
corporate real estate has played in these transactions. This way, more insights can
be gained in the market values and exact nature of the properties sold, the
dynamics of the property holdings before and after the takeover, and managerial
motivation driving the decisions. Besides that, it may be interesting to study the
role of corporate real estate in takeovers in countries besides those investigated in
this paper, especially those in Asia-Paciﬁc.
 Appendix
  Variable Definitions
Variable Deﬁnition
Return On Assets Net Income divided by the average total assets
over the year, in %.310  Brounen, van Dijk, and Eichholtz
Variable Deﬁnition
Sales Over Assets Net Sales (gross sales and other operating
revenue less discounts, returns and
allowances) divided by Total Assets (the sum
of total current assets, long-term receivables,
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries,
other investments, net property plant and
equipment and other assets).
Growth in Sales Current year’s Net Sales divided by last year’s
Net Sales, in %.
Average Liquidity Ratio The ratio of Net Liquid Assets (cash plus
marketable securities less current liabilities) to
Total Assets, in %.
Cash Holding Over Assets Total Cash (money available for use in the
normal operations of the company. It is the
most liquid of all of the company’s assets)
divided by Total Assets (the sum of total
current assets, long-term receivables,
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries,
other investments, net property plant and
equipment and other assets), in %.
Debt-to-Equity Ratio Long-Term Debt divided by Common Equity,
in %.
Book Value of Assets Sum of total current assets, long-term
receivables, investment in unconsolidated
subsidiaries, other investments, net property
plant and equipment, and other assets.
The Price-Earnings Ratio The ﬁrm’s end-of-year Stock Price divided by
its Earnings Per Share, in %.
Dividend Yield Ratio Dividends Per Share divided by the Market
Price-Year End, in %.
Price-to-Book Ratio Market Price-Year End divided by the Book
V a l u eP e rS h a r e ,i n% .
Average Excess Stock Return The excess of a ﬁrm’s annual total return over
the risk-free rate
Real Estate Over Assets The ratio of Buildings (the architectural
structure used in a business such as a factory,
ofﬁce complex or warehouse) and Total
Assets, in %.
Growth in Real Estate Percentage change in Buildings over two
consecutive years, in %.Corporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers  311
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 Endnotes
1 See Financial Times, May 9, 2005, p. 29.
2 See Financial Times, March 24, 2005, p. 31.
3 Rodriguez and Sirmans (1996) provide a comprehensive overview of the most relevant
literature.
4 An alternative is to use a logit model, in which F(Xi) is given by the cumulative logistic
probability function. Logit and probit models generally give similar results, as is outlined
by Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003). Unreported results show that the choice of a logit
instead of a probit model does not materially affect the results of the analysis either.
5 Excluding time dummies does not lead to notable changes in the regression results.
More results are available from the authors to illustrate this point.
6 See, for example Ambrose (1990), Seiler, Chantrath, and Webb (2001), Deng and
Gyourko (2003), and Brounen and Eichholtz (2004).
7 More extensive statistics regarding the global levels and trends in corporate real estate
ownership can be found in Brounen and Eichholtz (2004).
8 A list of explicit deﬁnitions of all control variables is presented in the Appendix.
9 Correlation statistics were calculated for the independent variables to check for the
potential presence of multicollinearity in the multiple probit regressions. The correlations
are generally relatively close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. This implies that a
simultaneous analysis of the explanatory variables is statistically feasible.
10 Similar results are obtained when unadjusted real estate over assets is included as an
explanatory variable.
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